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Anonymous
Log in (or create a user account) so that you can use the the Janet videoconferencing booking system. Figure 1. Janet videoconferencing home page
Anonymous
Link to the Janet videoconferencing booking service. Registered users can book or launch videoconferences and view the details of videoconferencing facilities at any of the Janet Videoconferencing registered organisations.
Anonymous
Necessary information: [ ] Title of conference (See 3.1) [ ] Purpose of conference (See 3.1) [ ] Conference duration (See 3.1) [ ] Name of conference coordinator (See 3.1) [ ] Email address/phone number of conference coordinator (See 3.1) [ ] List of venues for the conference (See 3.2) [ ] Names of main attendees at each venue (See 3.3) [ ] Names of main attendees at each venue (See 2.2) [ ] Guest venue (if included), does it have an IP or ISDN CODEC? (See 2.2)
Anonymous
Necessary information: [  ] Title of conference (See 2.1) [  ] Purpose of conference (See 2.1) [  ] Start and end dates (See 2.1) [  ] Start and end times (See 2.1) [  ] Name of conference coordinator (See 2.1) [  ] E­mail address/phone number of conference coordinator (See 2.1) [  ] List of venues for the conference (See 2.2) [  ] Names of main attendees at each venue (See 2.2) [  ] Guest venue (if included), does it have an IP or ISDN CODEC? (See 2.2) [  ] Guest venue E.164 number/ISDN number/IP address (See 2.2)
Anonymous
Executive Summary
Anonymous
[1] Wikipedia - IP address spoofing: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IP_address_spoofing [2] ZoneAlarm: http://www.zonelabs.com/ [3] Snort - the Lightweight Network Intrusion Detection System: http://www.snort.org/
Anonymous
In this particular incident, the initial tip-off led directly to the departmental network containing the compromised hosts. This information is not always so readily available, since IP spoofing can also be used to simulate traffic from machines on many different networks. Such a situation could be handled by repositioning the network monitor on the backbone (at M’ in the diagram, for example), and again examining the source MAC addresses of attack packets (but note that performance is likely to be a concern, with monitors dropping traffic at gigabit speeds).
Anonymous
We left the monitor in place for two days, until our log fi le began to grow rapidly indicating a new attack in progress. The following entries are typical of what was observed: [**] IDS253 - DDoS shaft synflood outgoing [**] 06/12-14:30:46.599036 8:0:20:1B:22:A9 -> 0:D0:D3:56:D1:30 type:0x800 len:0x3C 98.76.54.111:1008 -> 12.34.56.78:6666 TCP TTL:30 TOS:0x0 ID:59926 DF
Anonymous
Our monitor is a Linux system running the Snort lightweight intrusion detection system [3]. Demands on hardware are not very high: we use a redundant Pentium 133-based system with two 10/100Mbit/s network interface cards, 128MB memory and 4GB disk space. This allows us to use one interface to access the console, while the other is dedicated to the RSPAN traffic. It is configured with a minimum number of services running and no user accounts [4].